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The Business of Fraud
Purpose
This paper will focus on fraud within companies in order to discover overarching themes of why,
when, and where corporate fraud occurs. Fraud has significant financial, economic, and social
implications that negatively impact a company’s business standing. Research will be based on
recent frauds that have been tried through the United States Attorney’s office. Correlations will
be drawn regarding the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s
(COSO) framework, which is a foundation for companies who want to improve their internal
controls. Based on the comparisons between the COSO framework and recent fraud activity,
individual COSO principles can be analyzed for areas that are violated frequently. Evaluating
specific weaknesses in internal controls will elicit trends to identify control areas that should be
strengthened. From these results, it can be concluded how to integrate technology, internal
controls, and other security measures in order to decrease fraud within a company. This analysis
will provide a basis for companies looking to prevent, detect, and correct internal controls in
relation to fraud.

Literature Review
Corporate crime, or corporate corruption, has become a topic of public interest since the
American ‘Great Recession’ of 2007-2009. According to the Harvard Law Record, corporate
crime has done more damage to society than all street crimes combined (Mokhiber, 2015). The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimates street crimes, such as burglaries and robberies,
cost $4.5 billion a year, whereas money lost by fraud can amount to $6.3 billion (ACFE, 2016).
Corporate corruption is rarely evaluated through government regulation, creating a small risk for
repercussions or punishments. The undermining of such crimes allows the public to view
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corruption as a routine business activity, when in fact, it is quite detrimental.

Fraud is defined as “the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate
misuse and misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets” (Wells, 2007, pg.
2). There are four criteria used in the legal system that determine if fraud is present within the
case, whether civil or criminal. These factors provide a strong basis in understanding what fraud
is and the repercussions that can follow from fraudulent acts. The criteria include “a material
false statement, knowledge that the statement was false, a victim’s reliance on the false
statement, and damages resulting from this reliance” (Wells, 2007, pg. 3). When applied to a
corporate setting, fraud can be regarded in two facets: misappropriation of assets or financial
statement fraud. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), provides
definitions on both these types. In the AICPA’s Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82,
misappropriation of assets involves the theft of an entity’s assets where the effect of the theft is
not presented on the financial statements (AICPA, 2002, pg. 1722). This same section describes
financial statement fraud as intentional misstatement, or omission, of amounts, or disclosures, in
financial statements, designed to deceive statement users (AICPA, 2002, pg. 1722).

SAS No. 82, also identifies conditions in which fraud generally occurs. The system described is
known as the fraud triangle, depicted as Figure 1. The AICPA sees that, first, employees must
demonstrate an incentive or a reason to commit fraud, known as pressure. Pressure can come
from several factors including personal financial concerns or workplace troubles. Next,
ineffective controls must be present within a company to provide an opportunity to commit
fraud. For example, if an employee had the ability to write checks and also the duty of
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Figure 1: The Fraud Triangle
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2016)
reconciling the bank statements, there is an internal control lapse, which provides opportunities
to commit fraud. Finally, a person must be able to justify, or rationalize, their actions both while
committing a fraudulent act, and also after the crime. Frequent fraud rationalizations involve the
fraudster seeing themselves as a victim, rather than as a criminal. With all three factors present,
the AICPA considers the environment to be more prone to fraudulent threats, whether the intent
is misappropriation of assets or financial statement fraud.

Subsequent to an uncovered fraud, there are several consequences a company must face, as well
as changes that must be implemented. A company must relieve a fraudster of their duties and
proceed to hire, train, and monitor a new employee for that position. Next, the corporation’s
internal culture and ethical standards should be assessed. With the discovery of fraud, all
company employees should be reevaluated and briefed on the company’s moral standing and
policy in order to prevent future fraudulent acts. Finally, a company must evaluate their internal
3
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controls on how they detect and prevent fraud, and ultimately, how their system must adapt
based on the current discovered fraudulent actions. While a company reasserts their internal
structure, they must simultaneously evaluate the public damage the corporation faces. Fraud can
impact investors’ trust in the company, leading to a decrease in capital for the corporation
(Romney and Steinbart, 2015, pg. 68).

These implications allude to the fact that fraud has a significant financial impact that affects both
the company responsible and the economy. According to Financial Statement Fraud: Prevention
and Detection, “it is impossible to determine the actual total costs [of fraud] since not all fraud is
detected, not all detected fraud is reported, and not all reported fraud is legally pursued” (Rezaee,
2002, pg. 8). Despite these difficulties, there is an investigative interest with accounting
professionals, business managers, government agencies, and the media to understand and assess
the costs associated with fraud. According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiner’s
(ACFE) Report to the Nations On Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2016 Global Fraud Study,
valuing fraud is important because, “understanding the size of the problem brings attention to its
impact, enables organizations to quantify their fraud risk, and helps management make educated
decisions about investing in anti-fraud resources and programs” (ACPE, 2016, pg. 8). Fraud
causes a company to have increased insurance and legal costs, as well as expenses from a loss in
productivity. Other non-monetary fraud deficiencies include a decrease in employee morale and
customer goodwill, loss of credibility, and negative stock market reactions.

As indicated earlier, there are two main forms of fraudulent business activities, asset
misappropriation and financial statement fraud. These two types of frauds can be broken down
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and assessed in monetary terms. Asset misappropriation is understood to be the most common
type of fraud committed. According to the ACFE Report to the Nations, an estimated 83% of the
fraud cases studied were asset misappropriation. However, these cases were financially
immaterial because they had lower costs/losses. The ACFE study found that the median asset
misappropriation loss from fraud was $125,000 (ACFE, 2016, pg. 5). The same information
valuation can be assessed for financial statement fraud. Only 10% of cases studied by the ACFE
were considered financial statement fraud, indicating financial statement fraud is far less
common than asset misappropriation. However, financial statement frauds did have a higher
median loss at $925,000 (ACFE, 2016, pg. 5). These statistics are indicative as to why
government regulation on fraud is seen as undermined. Government agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are concerned with company financial statement
frauds because of their larger financial impact on the economy.

The accounting profession has several oversight boards and institutions that regulate a
corporation’s accounting practices. Notably, the SEC, an agency of the federal government,
administers the trading of assets, or securities, through laws, rules, regulations, and other
activities. When a company is suspected of committing fraudulent acts, the SEC has the power to
begin an investigation involving the corporation’s financial statements and other accounting
documents.

Another form of government regulation for fraudulent acts is through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX). Congress passed this act in 2002 in response to scandals involving Enron and
WorldCom. SOX implemented rules and regulations for managers, accountants, and
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stakeholders, alike. From an accounting prospective, it took the industry from being relatively
autonomous, to heavily governed (Franklin, 2016, pg. 56). SOX Section 404 is considered to
have the biggest impact on company management and accountants. It is written as: “issuers are
required to publish information in their annual reports concerning the scope and adequacy of the
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. This statement shall also assess
the effectiveness of such internal controls and procedures” (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002, par. 2).
SOX created the importance of implementing internal controls, along with updating and
assessing their effectiveness.

One of the more significant implications of SOX is that companies have a responsibility to create
and maintain internal controls. An internal control is “a process effected by a company, designed
to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives relating to operations,
reporting, and compliance” (Romney and Steinbart, 2015, pg. 345). This definition provides a
broad statement of how a company looks to prevent, detect, and correct fraud. Preventing fraud
is seen as a preemptive action, where internal controls reduce the likelihood of fraudulent acts.
Segregating duties is an example of a preventative control, as it aims to deter fraud from
happening. The AICPA defines segregation of duties as: “shared responsibilities of a key process
that disperses the critical functions of that process to more than one person or
department” (Ghosn, 2017, pg.1). Segregation of duties allows for procedures to be disbursed
across a company in order to prevent the opportunity of committing fraud. Detecting fraud
involves discovering problems quickly when they arise. Fraud detection can come from simple
measures such as validating a bank reconciliation. Finally, corrective controls provides a remedy
to problems that have occurred within an organization. Corrective controls look to identify a
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cause, to correct the errors, and also to
modify a system in order to prevent future
problems.

When analyzing a company’s internal
controls, it is suggested to utilize the
framework devised by COSO. This
organization combines several accounting
organizations including the American
Accounting Association (AAA), the
American Institute of Certified Public

Figure 2: Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) Framework, 2013

Accountants (AICPA), Financial Executives
International (FEI), The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the National Association of
Accountants, which is now the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA). With the
partnership of several influential accounting parties, COSO has been able to develop an evolving
framework which helps companies “design and implement internal controls, increase control
effectiveness, and decrease vulnerable areas” (McNally, 2013, pg. 3). The framework can be seen
as Figure 2. Visually, this framework promotes coherent regulations across a company. Business
objectives, internal control functions, and the employees of a company must all be synchronized
in order for the framework to be successful.

In order to analyze COSO’s effectiveness in preventing fraud through internal controls, it is
necessary to break down the different components in the COSO framework. This evaluation will
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continue to reference Figure 2. The top of the cube is concerned with a business’ objectives,
which include operations, reporting, and compliance objectives. Operations objectives
effectively and efficiently maintain company performance and profitability. Reporting objectives
involve the accuracy, completeness, and reliability of company reports and statements. Finally,
compliance objectives hold a company responsible for following the laws and regulations
enacted by government agencies, such as the SEC. The right side of the cube outlines the various
levels of employees working at a company. This articulates that a company must impose a topto-bottom approach when implementing internal controls in order to unify all areas of the
business. The front facing side of the COSO framework involves the components for effectively
creating, maintaining, and managing internal controls. Each provides an essential element to the
success of a company's internal control system.

The five components of the COSO framework are as follows: control environment, risk
assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities. Each is
described as follows. The combination of these components offers a guidance for companies
looking to improve their existing internal control systems (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5).
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• The Control Environment
The control environment establishes a culture of a company which serves as the
foundation for awareness and support of company policies. Factors involved in the control
environment are management philosophy, ethical values, and human resource standards.
• Risk Assessment
Risk is the possibility an event will occur to adversely affect organization objectives. Risks
are assessed in order to determine a company’s ability to achieve its objectives.
• Control Activities
The control activities component creates policies and procedures that can provide
reasonable assurance for company objectives. Control policies and procedures are
established and implemented throughout an organization in order to achieve a cohesive
internal control structure. Examples of controls can include authorizations, document
design, safeguards, and independent checks.
• Information and Communication
Information and communication allows a company's internal control system to collect and
exchange information needed to maintain its operations. Effective communication is
facilitated up, down, and across a company in order to provide a clear understanding of
business operations and control activities.
• Monitoring Activities
Monitoring activities are used to assess the quality of an internal control system.
Monitoring can include evaluation of system design, as well as, a function of a system’s
effectiveness in preventing, detecting, and correcting problem areas.
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Each COSO component has several principles underneath. The principles are requirements and
initiatives set to maximize the relevance of the internal control component. Both the components
and principles of COSO are outlined in Table 1 below (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5).
Table 1: COSO Internal Control Framework Components and Principles
Control Environment

1. Commitment to integrity and ethical values.
2. Board of directors is independent of management and exercise
oversight for the development and performance of internal controls.
3. Management establishes structures, reporting lines, and appropriate
authority and responsibility in pursuit of objectives.
4. Organization commits to attract, develop, and retain competent
individuals in alignment with objectives.
5. Organization holds individuals accountable for their internal control
responsibilities.

Risk Assessment

6. Organization specifies objectives with sufficient clarity to enable the
identification and assessment of risks relating to objectives.
7. Identifies risks to the achievement of its objectives across the entity and
analyzes risks as a basis for determining how the risk should be
managed.
8. Considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks.
9. Identifies and assess changes that could significantly impact the system
of internal control.

Control Activities

10. Selects and develops control activities that contribute to the mitigation of
risks to the achievement of objectives to acceptable levels.
11. Selects and develops general controls activities over technology to
support the achievement of objectives.
12. Deploys control activities as manifested in policies that establish what is
expected.

Information and
Communication

13. Generates and uses relevant, quality information to support the
functioning of other components of internal controls.
14. Internally communicates information including objective and
responsibilities for internal controls.
15. Communicates with external parties regarding matters affecting the
functioning of other components of internal control.

Monitoring Activities

16. The organization selects, develops, and performs ongoing evaluations to
ascertain whether the components of internal control are present and
functioning.
17. Evaluates and communicates internal control deficiencies in a timely
manner to parties responsible for taking corrective action.

Retrieved from: coso.org (2014)
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The COSO framework provides a company with a foundation for effective internal controls.
However, there are requirements for the framework’s success. The components and principles
outlined above must be present and functioning within a company (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). To be
present and functioning within a system, a control must first exist, and then be conducted in a
manner that achieves organizational objectives. Another requirement is that the COSO
components are integrated; the components are interdependent and have multiple
interrelationships and linkages, which requires that they all operate together (COSO, 2014, par.
1-5). The successful implementation of the COSO framework is necessary for its effectiveness.
Deficiencies can cause a company to be susceptible to fraudulent acts.

Technology has become integrated within companies and can be used effectively as an internal
control. Correctly implementing preventative, detective, and corrective controls will be an
impactful tool in deterring the likelihood of fraud within a company, which can be assisted
through the use of control technology. Elaborate information systems and resource management
programs often involve complex codes, protections, and safeguards. While the magnitude of
these functions are beneficial to an extent, integrating basic technology procedures in a company
can be the ultimate determining factor in whether fraud is committed, or not.
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Research Questions to be Answered
1. What set of internal controls could have been used to prevent recent actions of fraud?
2. How could internal controls be improved with technology?
3. Which COSO components/principles are undermined most frequently when fraudulent
acts are committed? How do vulnerabilities within the COSO framework correlate to
recent fraud cases?

Methodology
The research method used throughout this thesis was empirical and analytical. Research was
focused on recent fraudulent acts posted through the United States Attorney’s Office. The press
releases issued by this office provided sources of recent claims of fraud that were compared
categorically. As a way of providing consistent research, the search was limited to frauds with
press releases in 2016, which approximated 1,900 case files. It was assumed that most fraudulent
acts happened in years prior to the court hearing issued by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. In this
way, all information corresponds will press releases dated in 2016, regardless of the year the
fraud was committed. Another filter applied to the search was based on location. The court cases
and fraudulent acts that were analyzed were based in: Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and
Wisconsin.
Table 3: Number of Frauds Gathered per State
State

Number of 2016 Cases Used in Data Set

Illinois

30

Iowa

11

Minnesota

7

Missouri

21

Wisconsin

4
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Elimination of cases based on type of fraud was necessary in order to provide a cohesive data set.
For example, governmental frauds, such as insurance and health care fraud, and individual’s
frauds were not used in the sample. Research was narrowed down by keywords and phrases
based on the type of fraud committed. Examples of these terms included: fraud, embezzlement,
laundering, etc. Based on the source parameters, the following data was collected for each case:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Company/Institution
Type of Company
Individual(s)
Position
Guilty of (type of fraud)
Convicted (yes or no)
U.S. State Crime was Committed
U.S. Attorney’s District
U.S. State Crime was Tried in
Level of Court
Outcome of Case
Year(s) of Crime
Year of Press Release (U.S. Attorney’s Office)
Description of Fraud
Fraud Hierarchy (Wells, 2013, pg. 72)
COSO Component(s)
• Control Environment
• Risk Assessment
• Control Activities
• Information and Communication
• Monitoring Activities
COSO Principle(s)
• Main four principles documented
Internal Control(s)
Technology Functions
Other Recommendations

The companies and fraud cases in this table will serve as the basis for evaluation of technology
based internal controls (See Appendix A). Information collected from recent fraud cases will test
COSO components and principles for vulnerabilities. Conclusions will be dependent on the
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deficiencies of the COSO framework and the implementation of specific technology functions
within a company’s internal control structure. These factors can be assessed based on the internal
control’s effectiveness at preventing, correcting, and detecting fraud. This thesis will expand on
the information within the table, providing examples on the types of fraudulent acts committed
and assessing the internal controls.

Results
Research of the frauds within the study helped to determine weaknesses in COSO principles
when fraud occurred. These areas are indicators of vulnerabilities, which were then analyzed
based on principles of the framework. Through the determination of the most violated framework
areas, conclusions on internal controls were made. The results provided a more in-depth analysis
on ways to prevent fraud, data is shown in Appendix A. Evaluation of these fraud cases creates
generalizations that other companies can use in order to minimize their susceptibility to fraud. It
also ascertains which parts of COSO to emphasize when connecting fraudulent cases to internal
control systems. As outlined throughout this report, decreasing fraudulent risk is beneficial for a
company’s financial position and the economy as a whole.

The results of this study combine both similarities and differences of the fraud cases in order to
gain a more wholistic conclusion. By researching companies across different industries, the
capacity of fraud and its prevalence in even well-known corporations is articulated. Since there
are a variety of types and variations of fraud, it will be necessary to remain free of absolutions.
There is no guarantee of the prevention of all types of fraud, however, certain measures can be
put in place to reduce the risk. These measures are articulated in the findings. The COSO

14

The Business of Fraud
framework outlines requirements of internal controls which are proven to mitigate fraud risk.
This thesis looks to show the importance of internal controls, and specifically technology
measures to implement and enhance these controls. Trends based on the information collected
are highlighted below. Each conclusion relates the sample of fraud cases to internal controls and
the COSO framework. The results are beneficial to companies looking to mitigate their
susceptibility to fraud because of the conclusion’s versatility and adaptability.

Position Analysis
Data collected from the sample included the perpetrator of the fraud and their position within
the company. Analysis of position is important because it relates to the first component of
the COSO framework, control environment. COSO defines the control environment as: “the
set of standards, processes, and structures that provide the basis for carrying out internal
control across the organization” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). The control environment is defined
at the top of the organization, in positions such as the board of directors and senior
management, if applicable. For smaller, local businesses, the top of the organization may be
limited to the owner/operator. In either instance, the control environment sets the standard for
integrity, ethical values, corporate responsibly, and a hierarchy of authority within a company
(COSO, 2014, par. 1-5).
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Figure 3: Report to the Nations On Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2016 Global Fraud Study
(ACFE, 2016, pg. 49).

The ACFE Report to the Nations On Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2016 Global Fraud
Study, has determined trends in fraud cases around the world. One of their conclusions relates
to the control environment by analyzing fraud cases based on the position of the perpetrator.
Their data is depicted as Figure 3 above.

The relevant component of this graph is the line, depicting the percent of fraud cases that
relate to each position. Employee level positions comprise of 40.9% of fraud cases studied,
manager, 36.8%, owner/executive, 18.9%, and other, 3.4%. The bar graph component
measures median financial loss of the company based on the frauds committed in each
position, this information was not evaluated in the thesis project. The control environment
influences each level of authority in a company. Lenient regulation or poor supervision of
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employees can be explanations for why 40.9% of company employees were able to commit
fraud. This correlation can be drawn because a lack of a control environment creates a lack of
responsibility and authority within the organization.

The fraud cases examined through the U.S. Attorney’s Office produced contrasting results to
the Report to the Nations. Figure 4 depicts the data collected for the purpose of this thesis:

Position Analysis
Top level
36%

45%

Middle
management
Employee

19%

Figure 4: Position Analysis for Fraud

For the purpose of this study, the following labels were created: top level, middle
management, and employee. The composition of these roles include:

• Top level — owner, co-owner, operator, executive director, president, vicepresident, CEO, CFO, COO, CIO, partner, superintendent, board officer, director,
and financial comptroller
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• Middle management — general manager, treasurer, supervisor, office manager,
senior payroll specialist, administrative manager, portfolio manager, business
manager, IT manager, and sheriff

• Employee — employee, customer, financial advisor, business relationship
coordinator, bookkeeper, trader, accountant, city clerk, financial secretary,
investment broker, sales representative, and customer service representative

The graph depicts that top level management committed 45% of fraud cases, middle
management, 19%, and employees, 36%. Differences from the Report to the Nations and this
thesis data can be attributed to the scope of the data gathered. The thesis data was composed
of smaller scale frauds, evaluated in a limited geographic area in the United States. Despite
these differences, common conclusions can be drawn from the results.

The control environment of a company has a significant impact on the level within a
company where fraud is committed. Executive level frauds establish a negative tone for
employees regarding the ethical standards and responsibility of all employees. This can
contribute to fraud being committed at lower levels within a company. Companies have a
responsibility to successfully create a strong control environment. The environmental
structure of a company, if incorporated effectively, is an internal control.

Type of Fraud Committed
There are two types of fraud recognized by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA): financial statement fraud and asset misappropriation. As indicated
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earlier, financial statement fraud is the intentional misstatement of financial statements,
whereas misappropriation of assets is the theft of company assets (AICPA, 2002, pg. 1722).
For the purpose of this research, analysis focused on financial statement fraud, asset
misappropriation, and corruption. Corruption is seen as a third type of fraud in the Corporate
Fraud Handbook by J.T. Wells. In this publication, corruption is defined as “an act done with
the intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of
others” (Wells, 2011, pg. 259). Each category, financial statement fraud, asset
misappropriation, and corruption, is broken down based on a hierarchy and sub network. The
hierarchy is described below:
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• Financial statement fraud
• Financial
• Asset/revenue overstatements — timing differences, fictitious

•

•

revenues, concealed liabilities and expenses, improper
disclosures, improper asset valuations
• Asset/revenue understatements
Non-financial
— employment credentials, internal documents, external
•
documents
Asset misappropriation
• Cash
• Larceny — of cash on hand, from the deposit, other
• Skimming
• Sales — unrecorded
• Receivables — write-off schemes, lapping schemes,
unconcealed
• Refunds and other
Fraudulent
disbursements
•
• Billing schemes — shell company, non-accomplice
vendor, personal purchases
• Payroll schemes — ghost employees, commission
schemes, workers’ compensation, falsified wages
• Expense reimbursement schemes — mischaracterized
expenses, overstated expenses, fictitious expenses,
multiple reimbursements
• Check tampering — forged maker, forged endorsement,
altered payee, concealed checks, authorized maker
• Register disbursement — false voids, false refunds
• Inventory and all other assets
• Misuse
• Larceny — asset requisition and transfers, false sales and
shipping, purchasing and receiving, unconcealed larceny
Corruption
• Conflicts of interest — purchase schemes, sales schemes, other
• Bribery — invoice kickbacks, bid riggings, other
• Illegal gratuities
• Economic extortion

This breakdown of fraud allows for consistent analysis and classification for fraud cases. The
hierarchy was used for this purpose in the thesis research data set. Following a standard for
classification and using common terminology when researching fraud cases allowed for
conclusions to be made based on the frequency each type of fraud occurs. Figure 5
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documents the three categories of fraud, and their occurrence within the thesis data.

Type of Fraud Committed
Asset
misappropriation

13%
7%

Corruption
Financial statement
fraud

80%

Figure 5: Type of Fraud Committed

Asset misappropriation is the most common type of fraud from the data set, which is
consistent with research done through the ACFE Report to the Nations. Both financial
statement fraud and corruption make up smaller percentages of the overall data. In order to
document the use of Well’s fraud hierarchy, each category of fraud was broken down based
on various levels.

First, financial statement fraud was analyzed based on the initial layer of characterization,
financial or non-financial. Figure 6 is depicted below, highlighting the prevalence of financial
instances. ACFE Report to the Nations emphasizes that, although financial statement fraud is
not as common, it is very costly to an organization. According to the ACFE data, financial
statement fraud occurred in less than 10% of cases, but caused a median loss of $975,000
(ACFE, 2016, pg. 4). This loss is significantly higher than the monetary implications of asset
misappropriation and corruption.

21

The Business of Fraud

Financial Statement Fraud
9

Number of occurances

8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Financial

Non-financial

Type of financial statement fraud

Figure 6: Frequency of Financial Statement Fraud

Next, asset misappropriation was evaluated based on the theft of cash and the occurrence of
larceny, skimming, and fraudulent disbursements. According to the thesis data, the theft of
cash was more common at 90%, than the misappropriation of inventory and other assets,
which composed of 10% of the cases studied. The ACFE reports that asset misappropriation
was the most common type of fraud, indicated in more than 83% of cases, but it was the
lowest median loss at $125,000 (ACFE, 2016, pg. 4). Larceny, skimming, and fraudulent
disbursements are the second layer of characterization based on Wells hierarchy. The
frequency of each type of cash asset misappropriation is depicted as Figure 7.
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Asset Misappropriation of Cash

Frequency of Occurance

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Larceny

Skimming

Fraudulent
Disbursements

Figure 7: Frequency of Asset Misappropriation Based Fraud

Finally, forms of corruption were analyzed to determine the frequency of their occurrence
within the data set. Corruption has one layer of characteristics, and of that, only two were
determined to be present within the cases researched. It was determined that conflicts of
interest and economic extortion were the types of corruption within the data. The ACFE data
determined that corruption cases were in the middle of financial statement fraud and asset
misappropriation with 35.4% of cases being reported as such, and a median loss of $200,000
(ACFE, 2016, pg. 4). Figure 8 depicts the frequency of conflicts of interest, composed of
sales schemes and purchasing schemes, compared to economic extortion.
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Corruption
4.5

Frequency of Occurance

4
3.5

Purchase
schemes

3
2.5
2
1.5

Sales
schemes

1
0.5
0
Conflicts of Interest

Economic Extortion

Figure 8: Frequency of Corruption Based Fraud

The culmination of primary thesis data and ACFE research draws similar conclusions. Asset
misappropriation is the most common type of fraud, in comparison to corruption and
financial statement frauds. By documenting each type of fraud and characterizing based on
Well’s hierarchy, comparisons and trends across the different cases can be analyzed. These
trends can be compared to the COSO framework, which evaluates internal controls. Risk
assessment is a COSO component that can be directly related to fraud prevention and
detection.

Risk assessment manages business risk from both external and internal sources. It involves
the identification and assessment of risks, as well as, risk tolerances (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5).
COSO had determined that management has the responsibility to establish company
objectives in relation to operations, reporting, and compliance standards (COSO, 2014, par.
1-5). Risks are then analyzed based on those objectives. A source of risk for a company is
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fraud. Management objectives should successfully outline the responsibility of employees in
relation to fraud risk. Operation objectives look to minimize the risk of asset
misappropriation, reporting objectives minimize financial statement fraud, and compliance
standards set regulations for corruption. Successful risk management of a company identifies
weaknesses in internal controls which can be influenced by both internal factors, such as
fraud, and external factors.

COSO Components and Principles
The COSO framework involves both components and principles, which are outlined and
described previously. The data was categorized and analyzed based on both the COSO
components and principles violated within each fraudulent act. The frequency of violations
can determine a pattern of weaknesses in company internal controls. Fraud cases were
assessed independently, and it was found that each case violated one or more COSO
component and principle. Figures 9 and 10 show the frequency each COSO component and

Figure 9: Frequency of COSO Component Violation
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Figure 10: Frequency of COSO Principle Violation

principle was faulted, respectively. The COSO principles are coordinated to the components
via color.

Discussion of each COSO component is provided below with COSO principles embedded
within the analysis. This section describes the elements within fraud cases that designated a
violation, and includes an example from the data set that emphasizes the violation of each
principle.

Control Environment
The control environment was the most prominently violated COSO component. This result is
expected since an entity’s ethical standards and obligations directly relates to fraud risk and
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the control environment. To violate the control environment component, the fraud case must
have depicted any of the following factors: lack of integrity, no management oversight of
internal controls, no hierarchy of authority or responsibility for employees, faltered
alignment of organizational objectives, or lack of accountability for internal controls. These
criteria are directly related COSO principles of the control environment.

An example of a control environment violation from the thesis data set is Fraud Case #53. As
a brief summary, Stuart B. Millner and Associates is an auction business in the eastern
district of Missouri, owned and operated by Stuart Millner. Millner misdirected profit and
sales revenue from auction clients to pay company expenses. He reported to customers that
auctioned items had sold for less than they actually were (Department of Justice, 2016).

The control environment was violated in this example due to the fact the owner of the
company did not act ethically when selling customer property. Top management is expected
to “establish directives, guidance, and control to enable management and other personnel to
understand and carry out their internal control responsibilities” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). The
design and evaluation for authority responsibility were not executed with respect to internal
controls functions. These weaknesses were discussed as part of the data evaluation for each
case. Possible internal controls and technology functions of the internal controls were
addressed for each case as well. For this example, possible internal controls for Fraud Case
#53 include the requirement of client approvals for deposits and withdrawals, and also
segregation of duties between custody of goods and reporting of sales. Also, the
reconciliation of company revenue accounts and customer revenue accounts to verify sales
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price would be beneficial. Technological functions include automatically entering sales
transactions into the company accounting system so no falsification can be made. It was also
noted as an additional recommendation that oversight is important because the owner of the
company committed the fraud. In this example, oversight could be potentially from city
governance.

COSO principles can also be evaluated. In Fraud Case #53, several principles can be
identified as being negligent within this organization. With relation to the control
environment, this case violated COSO principle number three. The principle states:
“management establishes structures, reporting lines, and appropriate authority and
responsibility in pursuit of objectives” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). As indicated above, Stuart B.
Millner and Associates disregards internal controls and ethical standards. Specifically, their
lack in segregation of responsibilities within the company provided an opportunity to commit
fraud, which directly correlates with COSO principle number three. Each level of the
company should have designated authorities and responsibilities which provide for a distinct
hierarchy of the control environment. The implementation of these internal controls would
create a system of accountability for the company, set a tone of compliance, and reduce fraud
risk.

A lack of a strong control environment, or any COSO component, makes a company more
susceptible to fraud. The control environment in particular sets a strong foundation for a
company which reinforces the expectations throughout the various levels of an organization
(COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). When there is a lack in the control environment, the support for the
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other COSO components is also lacking, which increases a corporations fraud risk. Investing
in the development of a sufficient control environment can be instrumental in a company’s
success.

Control Activities
The next most violated COSO component was control activities. A lack of control activities
provides an opportunity for fraud, which is illustrated above as a component of the fraud
triangle. Control activities are defined as “actions established through policies and procedures
that help ensure that management’s directives to mitigate risks to the achievement of
objectives are carried out” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). Violation of this component requires
evidence of any of the following aspects: lack of development in internal controls for
organizational objectives, no technological controls to support organizational objectives, or
no expectations deployed regarding control activities. Again, these criteria directly relate to
the control activity COSO principles.

An example involving the violation of the control activities component is Fraud Case #3.
This case involved Stadium Grill, a restaurant in the central district of Illinois. James Michael
Hill, the general manager, committed wire fraud from 2009-2013. Hill had access to the
restaurant accounting system in order to correct employee errors in entering purchases. He
changed records to delete certain cash sales, decrease the amounts of cash sales, and classify
cash sales as gift card purchases. He then stole and used the cash generated for his personal
use (Department of Justice, 2016).
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This is an example of the control activities violation because there were no internal controls
activities to prevent the misuse of accounting functions, indicating COSO principle number
ten and eleven were misappropriated. Principle ten states: “selects and develops control
activities that contribute to the mitigation of risks to the achievement of objectives to
acceptable levels” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). While principle eleven dictates: “selects and
develops general control activities over technology to support the achievement of objectives”
(COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). These principles allow for successful implementation of internal
controls within an organization, such as segregation of duties, in order to support business
objectives. Suggestions for internal controls for Fraud Case #3 include implementation of an
approval system that requires verification of the changes made in the company accounting
system by an independent party, such as the owner. As a technology function, documentation
should be maintained on the system in order to alert personnel of changes being made. These
additions can successfully address the lack on control activities within a company.

The control activities of an organization mitigate the opportunities for the occurrence of
fraud. The COSO framework is a dynamic and integrated model, meaning that all the
functions build off each other to create a cohesive set of standards for internal controls. The
development of control activities can impact operating functions, reporting functions, and
compliance functions within a business. In this sense, control activities can maintain dual
purposes and promote the objectives of an organization in multiple values. The
implementation of control activities is essential for a company to achieve its objectives.
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Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is an important component within a company’s internal control network, and
it was also frequently violated within the fraud case study. To understand risk assessment, the
definition of risk related to fraud and internal controls is: “the possibility that an event will
occur and adversely affect the achievement of objectives” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5).
Subsequently, COSO defines risk assessment as a “dynamic and iterative process for
identifying and assessing risks to the achievement of objectives” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). For
the purpose of this study, violation of the risk assessment components include the misuse of
risk assessment principles; examples include: unclear definition of organizational objectives,
no risks were identified or analyzed, lack of consideration in the potential of fraud, or no
assessed changes or implementation of changes that could have impacted the internal control
system.

An example of faulty risk assessment is documented as Fraud Case #26. Marty Turner Farms
operates in the central district of Illinois. Amy Ward was the bookkeeper in this institution
and she committed bank fraud from 2011-2015. The owners of the company left pre-signed
checks in Ward’s care when they were expected to be gone for long periods of time. Ward
wrote these checks to herself and deposited them in an account she shared with her husband.
She created fraudulent entries in the accounting software program to conceal her actions
(Department of Justice, 2016).

This case illustrates a lack of risk assessment principles, specifically principle number eight
which states: “considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5).
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The owners of the company did not evaluate the potential risks of fraud or how these actions
could go against company objectives based on their actions regarding the management of
their business. Internal controls that could be implemented in regard to Fraud Case #26
include the requirement for reconciliation of accounting records to account balances. Also,
segregation of duties should be implemented, one employee should write the checks, and an
independent employee should enter the information into the accounting system. As a
technology function, there could be a notification system that alerts an outside management
member of account disbursements. These functions could effectively demonstrate risk
assessment procedures and mitigate the opportunity for fraud.

In reiteration, the COSO frameworks is an all encompassing tool for a company. Risk
assessment is dependent on the prior establishment of organizational objectives, authority
and responsibility platforms, and the creation of control activities (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). All
organizations face risk independent of size, structure, industry, and level. Assessing risks
requires the identification of various internal and external possibilities that may adversely
affect a company. Although risks cannot be reduced to zero, strategic risks can be monitored
and evaluated, and unfavorable risks can be set to tolerant levels through internal controls.

Information and Communication
Information within an organization is a constant, dynamic tool. Information documentation
and communication is a regularly occurring activity within an internal control system.
COSO denotes that it is management’s responsibility to “obtain or generate and use relevant
and quality information from both internal and external sources to support the functioning of
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other components of internal controls” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). Violations of the information
and communication component include: generation of faulty or error-based information, lack
of internal communication, or lack of external communication. These violations correlate
with the information and communication principles outlined by COSO.

For example, Fraud Case #4 describes a fraud committed within John Deere and Company
by Harvey Ulfers, an employee. Ulfers committed wire fraud and money laundering from
2004-2013. He created falsified internal documents that allowed him to sell scrap metal
below market value. He also used a third party to launder the fraudulent proceeds for his own
personal use.

Ulfers violated the information and communication COSO component and principles. There
were weaknesses in John Deere’s internal controls in regard to creating these documents,
providing Ulfers with the opportunity to produce and communicate fraudulent information.
These activities are related to COSO principle number thirteen. Principle thirteen states:
“generates and uses relevant, quality information to support the functioning of other
components of internal controls” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). Within this principle is the
requirement and expectation to identify factors such as the timeliness, accuracy, accessibility,
and completeness of information used by a company. Also, data processing and
transformation based on this information should be monitored in order to continuously
generate relevant and quality information. Types of internal controls that could have been
initiated within Fraud Case #4 include maintaining a valid price list that documents the range
of acceptable selling prices for a product. Also, sales should be verified based on the
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selection of reputable and approved purchasers. For technology functions, sales should be
required to be entered based on the price list. In addition, the sales should be verified with the
accounts receivable and revenue account in order to maintain accurate information. Likewise,
the purchases should be verified with the approved list of companies. These controls would
increase the reliability of both information and communication within the organization and
externally.

Company generated information relies on the functions of the other COSO components.
Relevant and accurate information will be gathered based on proper control environment
standards and implementation of control activities. Even more, the issuance of quality
information will return to support the other functions of the COSO components by ensuring
the authenticity of the organization. Both internal and external sources use company
produced information, therefore the quality of communication regarding this information also
supports organizational objectives.

Monitoring Activities
The last COSO component, and least violated according to the thesis data set, is monitoring
activities. Monitoring activities are defined as “ongoing evaluations, separate evaluations, or
some combination of the two used to ascertain whether each of the five components of
internal control are present and functioning” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). Violations of the COSO
component are likewise violations of the COSO principles, including: no evaluations
regarding an entity’s internal controls, or lack of communication regarding internal control
deficiencies.
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An example of violation of monitoring activities is Fraud Case #43. Starkey Laboratories Inc.
located in Minnesota faced several fraudulent actions. Jerome Ruzicka, Scott Nelson,
Lawrence Miller, Jeffrey Taylor, and Lawrence Hagen were employees of the company and
were charged with embezzlement. The employees created a fictitious company to which
Starkey was required to pay consulting fees and commissions to. The money was directed to
the fraudsters’ bank accounts, and no services were provided. Also, they used their fake
company to buy discounted merchandise, which they then re-sold to other manufacturers for
profit. The employees also forged signatures to transfer assets to their fake companies.
Starkey’s company reports were falsified in order to conceal the transfer of money
(Department of Justice, 2016).

Due to the large number of fraudulent acts committed by these employees, it is evident that
Starkey lacks sufficient monitoring activities. Evaluation of internal controls should prove
shortcomings in several processes, which should be influenced by all five COSO
components, and several COSO principles. A specific principle violated is number sixteen:
“the organization selects, develops, and performs ongoing evaluations to ascertain whether
the components of the internal control are present and functioning” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5).
The lack of such evaluations contributes to the fraud risk within the organization. Internal
controls that should be present for Fraud Case #43 include the monitoring of employee
activists to determine risks associated with certain authorization procedures, the assessment
of employee accountability, and the segregation of duties within the accounting system. For
technology functions, the company accounting system should automatically enter
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transactions. There should also be a system for monitoring account activity, in which there is
a detection process for unusual and suspicious activities. Finally, there should be an approved
vendor list in which a company approves the suppliers of services. These records should be
maintained and updated by authorized personnel.

Monitoring activities can be broken down into two categories: ongoing evaluations and
separate evaluations (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). Ongoing evaluations provide timely
information by continuously referencing a specific business process; whereas separate
evaluations are determined by management based on business objectives. Both types of
monitoring activities assess whether internal controls are present and functioning. Evaluating
the effectiveness of an internal control is necessary in order to prevent, detect, and correct
fraudulent acts.

Limitations
The limitations of this research provide a holistic analysis of the data set. In particular, the
number of sources evaluated was limited in scope. All data is attributed to the Department of
Justice press release files, which documents prosecuted, high-profile cases. This source had
limitations individually, as it provided concise and limited details regarding the cases evaluated.
In addition, data from this source was filtered to only encompass financial fraud in the Midwest
during 2016. Further details and a broader scope would have provided a richer analysis and
created a stronger support for the applied conclusions.
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Conclusion
Fraud has financial, economic, and social bearings for an organization. Understanding why,
when, and where corporate fraud happened provided conclusions on how to mitigate fraud risk
within an organization. The evaluation of positions concludes the likelihood of fraud based on
level of employee, while the evaluation of the type of fraud indicates which type of fraud is most
likely to be committed within an organization. Through the assessment of each COSO
component, in relation to COSO principles, generalized internal control activities and technology
functions were identified. These results portrayed trends which can be versatile and applied to a
variety of organizations; while the documentation of these cases provided insights on how to
routinely improve internal control functions. Understanding each component and principle
within the COSO framework allowed for recommendations to be made to decrease the
opportunity and potential for fraud risk.
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Appendix A

1
Kankakee Valley Park District

Diversified Behavioral
Comprehensive Care (DBCC)

James Michael Hill

Roy Collins

George E. Smith

Employee

General manager

Executive director

Owner and operator

Position

Wire fraud and money laundering

Wire fraud

Wire fraud and mail fraud

Mail fraud and money laundering

Guilty Of

Illinois

Iowa

Illinois

Illinois

Illinois

U.S. State
Crime was
Committed

2008-2012

2004-2013

2009-2013

2013-2015

2008-2009

Year(s) of
Crime

Individual(s)

2
Stadium Grill
Harvey Ulfers

Securities fraud

Company/Institution

3
Deere and Company

President of Lislebased store

Case #

4
Charles J. Dushek

n/a

Capital Management Associates
Inc.

Illinois

2010-2014

5

Wire fraud and falsifying financial
reports

Illinois

n/a

2011-2014

Nandu Thondavadi and
CEO and CFO
Dhru Desai

Mail fraud

Illinois

Illinois

Owner and operator

Wire fraud and mail fraud

Embezzlement

Quadrant 4 System Corporation

Alan P. Gold

Owner

n/a

President

7
A.P. Gold Realty & Management
Inc.

Elizabeth Perino

Illinois

Local 6 of the International Union of
David Fleury
Bricklayers and Allied Craft workers

8
Perdel Contracting Co.

Wire fraud

6

9

Customer

2008-2011

Salvatore Cribari

Illinois

2010-2013

"Company A"

Mail fraud: illegally structuring
financial transactions,; mail fraud:
and willfully filing a false income
tax return

Illinois

10

Owner and
accountant,
respectively

Wire fraud

Right Field Rooftops LLC

Owner

11

Marketaction Inc., Marketaction
Advisors LLC, Marketaction Capital Clayton Andrew Cohn
Management LLC

Marc Hamid and
Joseph Gurdak

12
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2

1

Asset misappropriation

Asset misappropriation

Corruption

Conflicts of interest

Cash

Cash

Conflicts of interest

Sales schemes

Skimming

Larceny

Sales schemes

Understated sales and receivables

Of cash on hand

Fraud Hierarchy (Wells, 2013, pg. 72)

3
Corruption

Case #

4

From the deposit

Concealed liabilities and expenses

Larceny

Asset/Revenue
overstatements

Fictitious revenues

Cash

Financial

Asset/Revenue
overstatements

Fictitious revenues

Asset misappropriation

Financial statement fraud

Financial

Asset/Revenue
overstatements

False sales and shipping

5

7

Financial statement fraud

Financial

Larceny

Of cash on hand

8
Financial statement fraud

Inventory and all other assets

Asset/Revenue
understatements

Larceny

9
Asset misappropriation

Financial

Asset/Revenue
understatements

Cash

10

Financial statement fraud

Financial

Asset misappropriation

11

Financial statement fraud

6

12
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X

Control
Activities

1
X
X

Control
Risk
Environment Assessment

2
X
X

Case #

3
X

X

4
X

X

5
X

X

X

6

Information and
Communication

X

Monitoring
Activities

X

X

3

3

4

2

1

5

15

10

11

5

2

8

16

16

8

5

COSO Principle(s)

2

10

10

3

12

2

X

1

X

15

7

13

X

2

X

16

8

10

15

2
8

13

15

X

6

2

13

9

1

2

X

X

1

X

X

X

X

11

X

10

12
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Case #

1
2
3

Internal Control(s)

Technology Functions

Create a notification system that alerts an outside management member
of expenses charged to the account.

Create a notification system that alerts an outside management member
of expenses charged to the account.
Documentation maintained on the company accounting system in order
to verify changes made.
Function that requires sales to be entered based on price list. Verifies
the sale with accounts receivable and sales revenue account. Verify the
purchaser/supplier to the approved list of companies.
Form that requires information be entered before proceeding with a
transaction.

Funds are automatically entered on the company's financial
Direct deposit and updated account balances once money enters the
records. Bank accounts are held separate from owner and records
company bank account.
are available to creditors/lenders.
Require reconciliation of accounting records to credit card
statements.
Approval system that verifies the changes made in the company
accounting system.
Price list that documents the range of acceptable revenues for a
product. Only verify selection of reputable and approved
purchasers/suppliers.
Segregate the information surrounding cliental and employees.

4
5
Require reconciliation of accounting records to credit card
statements and bank statements.

Automatic entry into the accounting system for
withdrawals and deposits into client accounts.

Require client authorization for the removal and use of cash.
Verify the reconciliation balances to the statement account
balances.

Validate changes in financial statement information by requiring
Cross reference information throughout an entities accounting system in
sign-offs from various department employees and manager's in
order to detect any misstatements.
order to segregate duties.
Create separate duties -- One person receives and records the
Require client authorization for the removal and use of cash. Verify the
cash. One person deposits the cash. One person reconciles the
reconciliation balances to the statement account balances.
balance.
Require sign-offs from client that verify the work was complete.
Use punch cards or another method of employee verification in order to
Verify the sign-offs to payments received.
document the work was completed.
Visual monitoring and increase security of store activates to prevent
Issue random inspections of customer receipts and verify the
stolen merchandise. Upgrade identity verification process in order to
purchaser.
deter the use of fake IDs.
Automated system that computes ticket sales per game and enters the
Separate accounting duties and owner/operator activities. Require
information into the account balances. Allow Cubs to have visual access
accounting department to submit account balances directly to the
to these balances in order to reconcile the numbers at the end of the
service organization.
period.

6

7

8
9
10

11

12
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U.S. State
Crime was
Committed

n/a

Year(s) of
Crime
Guilty Of

Illinois

Position

Financial advisor Wire fraud

2010-2014

Individual(s)

Delores J. Mosier

Illinois

Company/Institution

D.J. Mosier and Associates

Embezzlement

Case #

13

Vice-President

2008-2015

Kayla Bergstrom

Illinois

n/a

First State Bank

Wire fraud

Illinois

n/a

14

Wire fraud

Illinois

2012-2013

2008

Operator

Structuring financial
transactions

Illinois

2011-2016

Illinois

Partner and
Navdeep Arora and
consultant,
Matthew Sorensen
respectively

International Resorts Resale,
Resort Closing Services,
Gilbert Freeman
Timeshare Consolidators,
and Transfer my Timeshare

Partner

Embezzlement

Illinois

Concealment of assets from
a Bankruptcy Trustee

16

McKinsey & Company, Inc.
and State Farm

Dean Kreher

Treasurer

Wire fraud

President

17

Windoor

Jeffrey Magelitz

Supervisor

Joseph Michael
Phelan

18

American Federation of
State, County and Municipal
Employees, Local 415

Oliver Hamilton

Phezer Enterprises Inc.

19

East St. Louis Township

15

20
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18

17

16

15

14

13

Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Cash

Cash

Cash

Cash

Skimming

Inventory and all other
assets

Cash

Cash

Larceny

Larceny

Skimming

Fraudulent
disbursements

Sales

Misuse

Larceny

Larceny

Of cash on hand

Of cash on hand

Sales

Billing schemes

Unrecorded

Of cash on hand

Of cash on hand

Unrecorded

Shell
company

Fraud Hierarchy (Wells, 2013, pg. 72)

19

Asset
misappropriation

Case #

20
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Case #

Control
Risk
Environment Assessment

10

COSO Principle(s)

8

Monitoring
Activities

3

Information and
Communication

1

10

Control
Activities

X

8

15

10

X

3

2

8

10

X

1

1

7

8

10

13

X

1

3

8

10

X

16

X

1

3

8

X

15

X

X

X

1

5

14

3

16

X

X

X

1

X

1

X

17

X

X

X

X

18
X

X

15

19

X

X

20
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Case #

13

14

15

Internal Control(s)

Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Financial advisors must submit report with their activity
which can be reconciled with client
records/confirmations.
Authorization of select individuals to access information
of a particular account.
Approval system that requires department heads to
sign-off on bankruptcy. Reporting system the President
must follow to keep executives, board of directors, and
employees updated on the company financial position.

Technology Functions

Verify account validity by having an approved list of
investment options. Create notification system which alerts
management of activity outside of select investments.

Create a notification system that alerts an outside
management member of changes made in an account.

Require that higher level board of directors and
management team receive reports on the financial
capabilities of the company.

16

Require client authorization for the removal and use of cash.
Verify the reconciliation balances to the client account
balances.

Automatic entry into the accounting system for
withdrawals and deposits into client accounts.

Create a notification system that alerts an outside
management member of expenses charged to the account.

Automatically enter deposits and disbursements into
company accounting system.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

17

Segregate data entry duty and administrative
responsibilities.
Validate disbursements and payments through several
executives. Reconcile the bank statement records with
the check balance.
Require reconciliation of accounting records to credit
card statements.

Separate approval process for executives and
Use punch cards or another method of employee verification
employees regarding service work. Require approval
in order to document the work was completed.
from a third party that verifies work that was performed.

18
19
20
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Illinois

Illinois

Illinois

U.S. State
Crime was
Committed

2004-2013

n/a

2010-2015

2005-2014

Year(s) of
Crime

22

21

Lotawata Creek Inc. and
Lotawate Creek Southern
Grill

Scott Credit Union

Jerry Akin

Rodney Archer and
Owners
Kenneth Archer

`

24

26

First Farmers Financial LLC

Marty Turner Farms

Timothy Fisher

Pinckneyville Rural Fire
Tammy Kallerman
Protection District
U.S Department of Veteran's
Terrance Starks
Affairs

27

First Farmers Financial LLC

25

28

Thomas Lindstrom Trader

Guilty Of

Wire fraud

Illinois

n/a

Position

Employee

Mail fraud

Illinois

2011-2015

Individual(s)

Bookkeeper

Wire fraud and aggravated
identity theft

Illinois

2012-2014

Doctor's Office

Company/Institution

Employee

Bank fraud

Illinois

2012-2014

23

Case #

Bookkeeper

Wire fraud

Illinois

2014-2015

Business
Relationship
Manager

Amy Ward

CEO

Money laundering

Illinois

Rock Capital Markets LLC

Financial institution fraud,
misapplication of assets,
money laundering, making a
false record with the intent
to deceive
Conspiracy to obstruct the
IRS in the assessment and
collection of federal income
taxes

Nikesh Patel

President and
COO

Commodities fraud and wire
fraud

29
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Inventory and all other
assets

Asset/Revenue
understatements

Misuse

Cash

Internal documents

Fraudulent
disbursements

Improper asset valuations

Check tampering

Check tampering

Check tampering

Billing schemes

Fraud Hierarchy (Wells, 2013, pg. 72)

Asset
misappropriation

Financial

Case #

21

Financial statement
fraud

Cash

Cash

22

23
24

Asset
misappropriation

Nonfinancial

Asset/Revenue
overstatements

Fraudulent
disbursements
Fraudulent
disbursements
Fraudulent
disbursements

26

Financial statement
fraud

Financial

Misuse

Cash

27

Financial statement
fraud

Inventory and all other
assets

Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation

28

Asset
misappropriation

25

29

Personal
purchases
Concealed
checks
Altered
Payee

Altered
Payee
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Information and
Communication

Monitoring
Activities

COSO Principle(s)

3

10

Control
Activities

1

15

8

Control
Risk
Environment Assessment

2

3

Case #

1

10

X

X

X

21

X

X

X

22

X

10

23

8

10
3

10

8
1

8

3

X

3

14

1

X

X

13

15

X

X

X

2

13

X

25

X

X

2

X

26

X

X

24

27

X

13

28

10

X

1

X

X

29
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Case #

Internal Control(s)

Technology Functions

21

Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Financial advisors must submit report with their activity Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
which can be reconciled with client
system.
records/confirmations.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

Verify account validity by having an approved list of
investment options. Create notification system which alerts
management of activity outside of select investments.

Create a notification system that alerts an outside
management member of account disbursements.

Create a notification system that alerts an outside
management member of expenses charged to the account.
Create a notification system that alerts an outside
management member of expenses charged to the account.
Create a notification system that alerts an outside
management member of expenses charged to the account.

Leave a digital footprint of changes made in an accounting
system. Automatically flag changes that significantly alter the
transaction.

Separate accounting duties and owner/operator
activities. Require accounting department to verify
account balances.
Require reconciliation of accounting records to account
balances.
Require reconciliation of accounting records to account
balances.
Require reconciliation of accounting records to account
balances.
Require reconciliation of accounting records to account
balances. Separate the responsibilities -- one person
writes the checks and one person enters the
information into the accounting system.
Separate accounting duties and owner/operator
activities. Require accounting department to verify
account balances.
Separate accounting duties and owner/operator
activities. Require accounting department to verify
account balances.
Reconcile investment activity with market results.
Require confirmation from outside sources to verify the
balances of the investments.

22

23
24
25

26

27

28

29
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Position

Guilty Of

Year(s) of
Crime

Individual(s)

U.S. State
Crime was
Committed

Company/Institution

2008-2013

Case #

Illinois

2008-2013

Iowa

2004-2013

2009-2014

Mail fraud

Illinois

2004-2014

Wire fraud

Iowa

1978-2015

Co-owner

Iowa

2005-2014

Accountant

Embezzlement

Iowa

2000-2014

A Lamp Concrete Contractors Joseph
Inc.
Lampignano

Mail fraud

Iowa

Teresa Meeks

Board officer

Embezzlement

Iowa

30

Supervisor

Wire fraud

Primus Construction Inc.

Heidi Wagler

Employee

Mail fraud

Superintendent

Chad Michael
Saeugling

Office manager

34

Country Bancorporation

Linda Clark

Treasurer

A Lamp Concrete Contractors
Giovanni Traversa
Inc.

Peosta Warehouse

Pamela Harris

35

SCICAP Credit Union

Andrea Baker

31

32

Mason City Dental

36

Ames Chi Omega Alumnae
Association

Making false statements to
the FBI and U.S.
Department of Labor Office
of Inspector General

33

37

52

The Business of Fraud

30

Corruption

Financial statement
fraud

Inventory and all other
assets

Economic extortion

Nonfinancial

Fraudulent
disbursements

Larceny

Check tampering

False sales and shipping

Fraud Hierarchy (Wells, 2013, pg. 72)

31

Asset
misappropriation
Cash

Case #

32
Asset
misappropriation

34

Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Cash

Cash

Cash

Fraudulent
disbursements

Larceny

Fraudulent
disbursements

Fraudulent
disbursements

Check tampering

Of cash on hand

Payroll schemes

Check tampering

Workers'
compensation

Altered
Payee

Forged
endorsement

35

Asset
misappropriation

Cash

External documents

33

36

Asset
misappropriation

Altered
Payee

37
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Information and
Communication

Monitoring
Activities

COSO Principle(s)

3

Control
Activities

1

3

10

Control
Risk
Environment Assessment

1

8

Case #

X

2

15

30

X

X

X

31

X

10

X

8

10

32

3

8

10

10

X

2

8

8

8

X

X

3

2

3

X

X

X

1

X

34

X

X

X

X

35

X

X

X

36

X

33

37

10
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Use punch cards or another method of employee verification
in order to document the work was completed.

Technology Functions

Require sign-offs to verify the work was complete.
Verify the sign-offs to payments received.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Require authorization to override.

Internal Control(s)

30
Require sign-offs to verify payment was made. Verify
the sign-offs with court system and individuals.

Have a list of qualified shipment recipients which is updated
based on purchase order forms. Alert appropriate personal if
customers outside of the list are being used.

Case #

31

Complete inventory counts and reconcile numbers to
the shipment/purchase order records.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

32

33

34

35

Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
Employees must submit reports with their activity which
system.
can be reconciled with client records/confirmations.

Create a digital footprint of changes being made into
accounts and the company system in order to detect
fraudulent acts.

36

Separate the duties. One person writes and
Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
administers the checks. Another person reconciles the
system.
accounts to the bank statement.

Separate the duties. One person writes and
administers the checks. Another person reconciles the
accounts to the bank statement.
Separate the duties. One person writes and
administers the checks. Another person reconciles the
accounts to the bank statement.
Separate human resource duties and board activities.
Require HR department to verify and approve salaries.
Require accounting department to verify the salary
checks being disbursed.

37
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Mail fraud

Iowa

Iowa

U.S. State
Crime was
Committed

2002-2013

2009-2014

Year(s) of
Crime
Guilty Of

City clerk

Embezzlement

Position

Dorothy Dillinger

President

Individual(s)

City of Casey

Russell Wagler

Company/Institution

38
People's Savings Bank of
Crawfordsville

Case #

39

2009-2011

2012-2013

Iowa

Iowa

Bank fraud

Misapplication of bank funds

Employee

CFO

Securities fraud

Lori Bentler

Barbara Baker

CEO and CIO

M.H.I. Credit Union

Patriot Bank

David Walliver

40

41

Dblaine Capital, LLC

Minnesota 2010-2011

42

Minnesota 2006-2016

Starkey Laboratories Inc.

Embezzlement

43

Jerome Ruzicka,
Scott Nelson,
Lawrence Miller,
Employees
Jeffrey Taylor, and
Lawrence Hagen
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38
Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Conflicts of interest

Cash

Cash

Larceny

Other

Skimming

Fraudulent
disbursements

Receivables

Check tampering

Fraud Hierarchy (Wells, 2013, pg. 72)

39

Corruption

Cash

Case #

40
Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation
Cash

Larceny

Of cash on hand

Of cash on hand

41

42

Billing schemes

Altered
Payee

Shell
company

Fraudulent
disbursements

Forged
endorsement
Of cash on hand

Check tampering

Cash

Fraudulent
disbursements
Sales schemes

Asset
misappropriation

Conflicts of interest

Larceny

Cash

Cash

43

Asset
misappropriation
Corruption
Asset
misappropriation
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Case #

Control
Risk
Environment Assessment

10

COSO Principle(s)

8

Monitoring
Activities

2

Information and
Communication

1

Control
Activities

X

X

10

X

8

38

2

X

1

X

X

39

X

16

X

10

X

8

X

3

40

16

16

10

10

10

8

2

8

2

X

3

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

41

42

43
X

58

The Business of Fraud

Case #

38

39

40

41

42

43

Internal Control(s)

Separate the duties. One person writes and
administers the checks. Another person reconciles the
accounts to the bank statement.
Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Separate employee accounts and authorizations from
upper level management.
Specific monitoring for employee investment accounts.
Account is overseen by a manager or another
employee, authorization for changes is limited.
Separate accounting duties and executive activities.
Require accounting department to verify account
balances.
Separate accounting duties and executive activities.
Require accounting department of both the parent and
subsidiary to verify account balances. Monitor
executive activities.

Technology Functions

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
Monitoring of employee activities to determine the risks
system. Require a system of monitoring for accounts to
associated with certain authorization procedures.
detect unusual and suspicious activities.
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Wire fraud

Minnesota 2002-2012

Minnesota 2007-2015

Year(s) of
Crime

Director of
Accounting

Defrauding the State of
Minnesota

U.S. State
Crime was
Committed

Company/Institution

Diane Eiler

President

Minnesota 2007-2012

Guilty Of

Case #

AgQuest Financial Services,
Inc.
Roberta Barnes

Embezzlement

Position

44
Agape House for Mothers
and Sierra Young Family
Institute
Financial
secretary

Individual(s)

45
International Association of
Heat and Frost Insulators and Scot McNamara
Allied Workers, Local 34

Minnesota 2007-2013

William Davis

Customer

CEO

Wire fraud

Wire fraud and identity theft

Mail fraud, wire fraud, theft
concerning programs
receiving federal funds

Wisconsin

Wisconsin 2008-2012

Wisconsin 2007-2011

Minnesota 2007-2014

46

Investment broker Securities fraud

Community Action of
Minneapolis

Patrick Sweeney

Bookkeeper

Embezzlement

Wisconsin 2005-2014

Bradley Smegal

Fairview Ridge, LLC

Lisa Buchholz

Employee

Wire fraud

Wells Fargo

48

Four Seasons Wood
Products

Laura Ewing

Sales
representative

47

49

Wisconsin Coalition Against
Sexual Assault

Brad Volkmann

50

51

Spectrum Brands, Inc.

n/a

52
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44
Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Conflicts of interest

Cash

Cash

Purchase schemes

Skimming

Fraudulent
disbursements

Receivables

Check tampering

Write-off
schemes

Forged
endorsement

Fraud Hierarchy (Wells, 2013, pg. 72)

45

Corruption

Larceny

Case #

46

Cash

Cash

Fraudulent
disbursements

Billing schemes

Of cash on hand

Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation

Asset requisition and
transfers

Ghost
employees
Forged
endorsement
Altered
Payee
Altered
Payee

Personal
purchases

47

48

Larceny

Check tampering

Check tampering

Check tampering

Payroll schemes

Inventory and all other
assets
Cash
Cash
Cash
Cash

Fraudulent
disbursements
Fraudulent
disbursements
Fraudulent
disbursements
Fraudulent
disbursements

Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation

49
50

51
52
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8

5

16

10

COSO Principle(s)

2

2

8

10

Monitoring
Activities

1

3

8

Information and
Communication

1

3

Control
Activities

X

X

1

Control
Risk
Environment Assessment

44

X

X

X

Case #

45

X

X

X

46

X

X

47

X

1

8

2

3

3

10

10

8

8

8

10

10

10

16

X

X

1

3

X

X

X

1

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

48

51

X

50

49

52

62

The Business of Fraud

Case #

44

Internal Control(s)

Technology Functions

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Verify account validity by having an approved list of
Financial advisors must submit report with their activity
investment options. Create notification system which alerts
which can be reconciled with client
management of activity outside of select investments.
records/confirmations.

Require reconciliation of accounting records to credit
card statements.

Direct deposit and updated account balances once money
enters the company bank account.

46

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Limit changes to select authorized employees which
must be reconciled with other accounts.

45

47

Separate accounting duties and executive activities.
Monitor executive activities.

Authorization system which verifies the customer identity in
order to prevent the risk of fraud.

Separate accounting duties and executive activities.
Monitor executive activities.
Funds are automatically entered into the company's
financial records. Bank accounts are held separate
from owner and records are available to
creditors/lenders.

48

Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Reconcile the bank accounts with the customer
accounts.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

51

Create a notification system that alerts an outside
management member of expenses charged to the account.

49

Segregate bookkeeper duties and require that
information entered is reconciled to records to
determine fraud risk.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.
Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.

50

Reconcile the check records with the balance in the
company bank accounts.
Reconcile the check records with the balance in the
company bank accounts.

52
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Garmin

F.S

Stuart B. Millner and
Associates

Carla Rathmann

Patricia Webb

Linda Sweazy

Stuart B. Millner

Superintendent

Administrative
officer

Senior payroll
specialist

Employee

Owner and
operator

Embezzlement

Wire fraud and money
laundering

Wire fraud

Mail fraud and credit card
fraud

Wire fraud

Mail fraud

Bank fraud, mail fraud, and
wire fraud

Guilty Of

Missouri

Missouri

Missouri

Missouri

Missouri

Missouri

Missouri

Missouri

U.S. State
Crime was
Committed

2011-2014

2011-2015

n/a

1992-2005

2005-2014

n/a

n/a

n/a

Year(s) of
Crime

54

55

56

Position

University of Missouri

Christopher Hanson Owner

Public School and Education
Employee Retirement
Danny Colgan
Systems of Missouri

Portfolio officer

Wire fraud and mail fraud

Individual(s)

57

Hanson Holdings, LLC

Elisha Araiza

Owner

Company/Institution

58

Bank of America

Billings Chapman

Case #

59

Federal Financial Services,
LLC

53

60
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Case #

53
54

55

Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation

Cash
Cash
Cash

Cash

Cash

Of cash on hand

Billing schemes

Payroll schemes

Sales

Fraud Hierarchy (Wells, 2013, pg. 72)
Skimming
Fraudulent
disbursements
Fraudulent
disbursements
Larceny

Billing schemes

Cash

Larceny

Fraudulent
disbursements

Of cash on hand

Of cash on hand

Payroll schemes

56

Asset
misappropriation
Cash

Larceny

Receivables

Billing schemes

57
Asset
misappropriation

Cash

Skimming

Fraudulent
disbursements
Fraudulent
disbursements

58

Asset
misappropriation

Cash

Cash

59

Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation

60

Understated

Falsified
wages
Personal
purchases

Personal
purchases
Shell
company

Falsified
wages

Lapping
schemes

65
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Case #

53
54

55

10

COSO Principle(s)

15

8

10

Monitoring
Activities

3

3

8

Information and
Communication

1

3

Control
Activities

X

1

Control
Risk
Environment Assessment

X

X

10

X

X

X

8

X

X

2

X

X

1

1

15

2

10

X

3

8

1

15

X

1

X

10

X

57

X

X

X

58

X

X

59

X

56

60
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Case #

53
54

55

56

57

58

59

60

Technology Functions

Automatically enter sales transactions into company
accounting system.

Internal Control(s)

Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Reconcile the bank accounts with the customer
accounts.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Track changes and send alerts to management for
changes made in specific accounts.

Automatically enter sales transactions into company
accounting system.

Automatically enter sales transactions into company
accounting system.

Automatically enter sales transactions into company
accounting system.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Track changes and send alerts to Board for
changes made in specific accounts.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Track changes and send alerts to management for
changes made in specific accounts.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Track changes and send alerts to management for
changes made in specific accounts.

Reconcile the check records with the balance in the
company bank accounts. Require authorization to
change information in the system.
Require authorization to change information within the
system, approvals from management and department
heads. Reconcile original data with records at the end
of the year.
Create and approved vendor/supplier list. Authorization
and background information must be approved in order
to add/change information on the list. Reconcile
account balances to statements.
Require authorization to change information within the
system, approvals from Board of Education. Reconcile
original data with records at the end of the year.
Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Reconcile the bank accounts with the customer
accounts.
Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Reconcile the bank accounts with the customer
accounts. Increase management supervision and
confirmation of employee activities.
Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Reconcile the bank accounts with the customer
accounts.
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Bank fraud, wire fraud
counterfeit securities, and
money laundering

Customer service
Bank embezzlement
representative

Missouri

Missouri

Missouri

U.S. State
Crime was
Committed

2006-2011

2006-2015

2009-2013

Year(s) of
Crime

David Townley

President

Business
manager

Bank fraud

Wire fraud

Wire fraud

Missouri

Missouri

Missouri

Missouri

2007-2015

2010-2014

2010-2015

2010-2014

2011-2013

Guilty Of

Jo Ann Nickell

Accountant

Wire fraud and bank fraud

Nativity of Mary

Diane Heikkila

Bookkeeper

Wire fraud

Missouri

Position

Community National Bank

Thomas Hauk

Office manager

64

Joplin South Little League

Abbie Stemper

Financial
comptroller

Wire fraud

Individual(s)

61

Assured Management
Company
Jane Barnes

65
Smith Paper and Janitor
Supply

John Kruse

Bookkeeper

Company/Institution

62

ACI Boland Architects

66

BCC Merchant Solutions

Kimberly Padgett

Case #

63

67

Reliant Financial Services

2010-2016

68

68
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Cash

Larceny

Larceny

Of cash on hand

Of cash on hand

Fraud Hierarchy (Wells, 2013, pg. 72)
Asset
misappropriation

Cash

Case #

61

Asset
misappropriation

Payroll schemes

62

Cash

Fraudulent
disbursements

Billing schemes

Check tampering

Shell
company

Personal
purchases

Concealed
checks

63

Cash

Fraudulent
disbursements

Billing schemes

Falsified
wages
Forged
endorsement

Asset
misappropriation

Cash

Fraudulent
disbursements

Of cash on hand

Check tampering

64

Asset
misappropriation

Cash

Larceny

Check tampering

Fraudulent
disbursements
Fraudulent
disbursements

65
Asset
misappropriation

Cash

Fraudulent
disbursements

Cash

66

Asset
misappropriation

Cash

Asset
misappropriation
Asset
misappropriation

67

Asset
misappropriation

Concealed
checks

68

69
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X

Control
Activities

X

Information and
Communication

1

1

3

3

3

8

8

8

10

10

10

64

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

1

1

1

1

1

3

2

3

2

3

8

8

8

8

8

10

10

10

10

10

COSO Principle(s)

X

X

1

65

X

X

X

Monitoring
Activities

X

X

X

66

X

X

Control
Risk
Environment Assessment

61

X

X

Case #

62

X

67

X

63

68
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Case #

61

62

63

64

65

Internal Control(s)

Separate accounting duties and executive activities.
Monitor executive activities.

66

67

Reconcile the check records with the balance in the
company bank accounts.

Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Reconcile the bank accounts with the customer
accounts. Increase management supervision and
confirmation of employee activities.
Require approval of client deposits and withdrawals.
Reconcile the bank accounts with the customer
accounts. Increase management supervision and
confirmation of employee activities.
Require authorization to change information within the
system, approvals from management and department
heads. Reconcile original data with records at the end
of the year.
Require authorization to change information within the
system, approvals from management and department
heads. Reconcile original data with records at the end
of the year. Separate duties regarding the handling of
cash.
Require reconciliation of accounting records to credit
card statements.
Create and approved vendor/supplier list. Authorization
and background information must be approved in order
to add/change information on the list. Reconcile
account balances to statements.

68

Technology Functions

Automatically enter sales transactions into company
accounting system.

Automatically enter sales transactions into company
accounting system. Alert management if there are changes
in certain accounts.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Track changes and send alerts to management for
changes made in specific accounts.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Track changes and send alerts to management for
changes made in specific accounts.

Create a notification system that alerts an outside
management member of expenses charged to the account.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Track changes and send alerts to management for
changes made in specific accounts.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Limit changes to select authorized employees which
must be reconciled with other accounts.
Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system.
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The Business of Fraud

Mail fraud

Missouri

Missouri

U.S. State
Crime was
Committed

2011-2014

2013-2014

Year(s) of
Crime
Guilty Of

IT manager

Money laundering

Position

Rodney Tatum

Sheriff

Individual(s)

Clarkson Construction
Company
Joseph Kyle

Company/Institution

69

Christian County

Case #

70

2008-2012

2012-2014

Missouri

Missouri

Making false entries in
banking documents

2012-2014

Embezzlement

Bookkeeper

Missouri

Head teller

Diana Emery

Wire fraud

Katherine Brown

First Home Savings Bank

President

Hawthorn Bank

72

Lowell Wreh

71

73

American Federation of
State, County and Municipal
Employees, Local 1707

72

The Business of Fraud

70

69

Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Asset
misappropriation

Financial

Cash

Cash

Cash

Asset/Revenue
understatements

Larceny

Fraudulent
disbursements

Skimming

Of cash on hand

Expense reimbursement
schemes

Sales

Mischaracteri
zed expenses

Unrecorded

Fraud Hierarchy (Wells, 2013, pg. 72)
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Financial statement
fraud

Fraudulent
disbursements

Case #

72

Cash

Concealed
checks

Asset
misappropriation

Check tampering

73

73

The Business of Fraud

Case #

10

COSO Principle(s)

8

Monitoring
Activities

2

10

Information and
Communication

1

8

Control
Activities

X

2

Control
Risk
Environment Assessment

X

1

X

X

69

X

10

X

8

70

3

X

1

X

X

71

X

15

X

10

X

8

X

1

72

10

X

8

X

2

X

1

73
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The Business of Fraud

Case #

69

70

71

72

73

Internal Control(s)

Require reconciliation of accounting records to credit
card statements.
Monitoring of employee activities to determine the risks
associated with certain authorization procedures. Verify
invoices and purchase orders with the accounting
department. Separate duties.
Monitoring of employee activities to determine the risks
associated with certain authorization procedures.
Separate duty for someone to maintain count of
inventory in the bank vault.
Monitoring of employee activities to determine the risks
associated with certain authorization procedures.
Separate duty for someone to access financial records
and someone who has access to the inventory.
Require authorization procedures.
Separate accounting duties and executive activities.
Monitor executive activities.

Technology Functions

Create a notification system that alerts an outside
management member of expenses charged to the account.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Require a system of monitoring for accounts to
detect unusual and suspicious activities.

Install security cameras inside the vault in order to deter
stealing. Create a key code system to determine which
employees accessed the money and at what time.

Create a notification system that alerts an outside
management member of expenses charged to the account.

Automatically enter transactions into company accounting
system. Limit changes to select authorized employees which
must be reconciled with other accounts.
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